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ABSTRACT 
This study employs spatial panel techniques to examine determinants of regional 
allocation of infrastructure investment made by the central government. Using a sample 
of 31 Chinese provinces over the 2001-2008 period, we derived four major empirical 
findings. First, there exist substantial spatial interactions of central gove
investment across regions. Second, the central investment exhibits a highly persistent 
effect. Third, the central government attempts to balance equity and efficiency in its 
decision-making. Last, the political factor plays a significant role in the regional 
infrastructure investment. 
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1. Introduction 
The regional allocation of infrastructure investment made by the central (or federal) 
government is important for regional economic development. From the micro-level 
public 
investment in infrastructure such as railways, roads, irrigation systems, and airports increases 
the productivity of private capital, making private investment more profitable and promoting 
the national (regional) economy (Aschauer, 1989a, 1989b, 1993). Second, the central 
s regional disparities. Using Mexican panel data and a 
quantile regression method, for example, Costa-i-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2005) found 
that public investment smoothed over regional inequalities especially within the relatively 
richer regions. Fan and Zhang (2002), using rural data, found that infrastructure 
investments in the western rural areas are important in minimizing regional disparities. In 
addition, they found different types of infrastructure investments play different roles. For 
instance, investments in education and rural R&D have the largest impacts on reducing 
regional inequality in the western rural areas. 
From the macro-level perspective, central governmental investment has a major impact 
on promoting economic growth and on dampening economic fluctuations.1 Using a panel 
data set for 22 OECD countries during 1970-1995, Kneller et al. (1999) found that increasing 
public spending by 1% of GDP increases the growth rate by 0.1-0.2%. In the United States, 
for instance, the federal government has frequently used the spending tool via expanding 
infrastructure investment to fight against economic recession. During the 1991 recession, the 
United States invested $128 billion in infrastructure. To fight against the recession of the late 
2000s, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 poured about $850 billion into 
.2 Similarly, the Chinese government 
launched a stimulus package of 4 trillion RMB to the national economy. Of the total package, 
91% is allocated to public infrastructure investment.3 
Because of the significant role in investment played by the central government, it is 
important to explore the determinants of infrastructure investment across regions. To date, 
scholars have regional 
investment from both political and economic perspectives. Regarding political factors, 
scholars such as Atlas et al. (1995), Wallis (1998), Fleck (2001), Wu (2007), and Boyle and 
Matheson (2009) concluded that a state in the United States appears to obtain more federal 
investments if that state has more per capita representatives in the legislative bodies and more 
congressional delegates, or if ve a higher level of seniority and 
belonged to the same clan as the president. Cadot et al. (1999), using a panel of 21 French 
regions in 1985-1991, found that pork-barrel politics are significant determinants of the 
cross-regional transportation infrastructure investments. Kemmerling and Stephan (2002), 
using a panel data set of large German cities, provided evidence that it is easier for a city to 
obtain investment grants if the city council has the same political affiliation as the higher-tier 
state government. 
Some economic factors (e.g., the -efficiency concern) also influence 
regional allocations of central government investment. Lambrinidis et al. (2005), using a 
                                                             
1 For a detailed overview of the impact of infrastructure investment on economic development, see Gramlich 
(1994) and Sturm (1998). 
2 Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122962972741919179.html, viewed on March 2, 2011. 
3 According to the definition by the World Bank, the term 'infrastructure' refers to energy (including oil, gas and 
mining), information and communications technology (ICT), transportation, water supply, and sanitation and 
urban services. So, we get the percentage data provided by National Development and Reform Commission. 
The details of the 4 trillion RMB investment are shown in Appendix Table 1. 
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panel of 51 Greek regions during 1982-1994, showed that infrastructure investment was more 
intensively concentrated in less developed regions, reflecting the governme to 
reduce income inequalities. In analyzing the main determinants of the regional allocation of 
infrastructure investment for a panel of 51 Spanish regions over 1987-1996, Castells and 
Solé-Ollé (2005) demonstrated that both the central and regional governments attempt to 
balance equity and efficiency in the allocation of infrastructure investment. In addition, 
infrastructure investment by regional governments tends to be more inclined towards 
efficiency.  
The existing literature, however, ignores the spatial factor that also affects the regional 
allocation of public investment. When the central government makes a specific type of 
investment (say, on roads, railways, or pipelines), a region may obtain investment from the 
central government because these infrastructure constructions have to pass through the 
particular region. For instance, the Ministry of Railways implemented a project to build a 
high-speed railway in 2008 to connect Beijing and Shanghai. The route has to pass through 
five provinces (Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu). Accordingly, each province 
obtains investment funds from the central government. 
The existing literature also fails to distinguish the investment made by the central 
government from that made by regional governments. These two types of investments, in 
reality, function differently in affecting the local stock of infrastructure and economic 
efficiency. For example, due to bad planning or poor coordination across administrative units, 
roads could be disconnected between regions, - duantoulu in 
Chinese). Benziger (1993) noticed this phenomenon, stating it has been common for roads 
(in China) to end just short of the border, even when another road approached the border from 
the other side and ended o . As shown in Figure 1, region A 
and region B, respectively, build an Apple Road and a Banana Road if the decision is made 
individually. Neither government has the motivation to connect the two roads together (red 
dashed line in Figure 1) due to possible regional protectionism and the externality effect on 
road transportation. However, Cranberry Boulevard could be built to connect the two roads if 
the investment decision came from a higher-tier government. The connected road, adding the 
same to local infrastructure stock as the Apple and Banana roads, would not only help to 
internalize the transport externalities but also promote regional integration. 
 
Figure1. Broken-end road (left, source: www.sznsnews.com) 
 
This paper makes two main contributions to the existing literature. One is to include the 
spatial characteristics of infrastructure investment using spatial dynamic panel techniques; the 
other is to focus on the investment made by the central government. To our knowledge, 
rigorously examined. 
Specifically, we first develop a theoretical model of regional allocation of central government 
investment, where spatial factors, temporal factors, economic factors, and political factors are 
all taken into account. We then examine the determinants of regional allocation of 
infrastructure investment using a spatial dynamic panel technique for a sample of 31 Chinese 
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provinces over the 2001-2008 period. Our empirical findings reveal that there exist 
substantial spatial interactions of infrastructure investment across regions, the investment 
made by the central government exhibits a highly persistent effect, the central government 
attempts to balance equity and efficiency in its decision-making, and the political factor plays 
a significant role in the regional infrastructure investment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts 
on investments made by the central government in China. Section 3 introduces a theoretical 
model of the geographical allocation of central infrastructure investment. 
Section 4 describes the empirical model, data source, and estimation strategy. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and draws policy 
implications. 
2. Central Government Investment in China 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the characteristics of the investment made by 
the Chinese central government, from the perspective of investment scale, industrial 
distribution, and geographical distribution. 
Each year, the Chinese central government undertakes a large number of investment 
projects to construct and improve local infrastructure. These projects amounted to 773.66 
billion RMB (1 USD = 6.5 RMB) on average during 1995-2008, which accounted for 80.56% 
of the total budgetary fiscal revenue of the central government and 5.28% of the averaged 
GDP during the period.4 Figure 2 shows the level and growth rate of the real investment 
made by the central government, using 2008 as the base year and the consumer price index as 
the inflation factor. During 1995-2003, the stayed around 
the same level with an average annual growth rate of only 1.02%. Starting in 2004, China 
saw a rapid growth in its ent, rising from 733.97 billion RMB in 
2004 to 1717.25 billion RMB in 2008, with an average annual growth rate of 20.7%. 
 
Figure 2. Central governmental investment, 1995-2008 (2008 = 100) 
 
industries. Figure 3 depicts 
the distribution of the central investment funds allocated to each industry. Not surprisingly, 
the Transportation and Warehouse sector receives the highest share, followed by the Electric, 
Gas and Water Utilities sector, with the two sectors accounting for half of the total central 
                                                             
4 Data on total budgetary fiscal revenue of the central government and GDP are from China Statistical 
Yearbooks (1996-2009). 
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government investment. The Manufacturing and Mining sectors together accounted for one 
third of the total. The remaining industries had a small share.5 
 
 
Figure 3. by industries, 2008 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009 
 
Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 
1972) which states that the central government allocates public services uniformly to its local 
jurisdictions, China sees huge variations of central government investment across provinces, 
central-administrated municipalities, and autonomous regions. For instance, per capita 
investment from the central government to Jiangxi province was only about 290 RMB in 
2008, while the figure was 5620 RMB to Tianjin (one of four centrally administered 
municipalities (NBS, 2009). 
Figure 4 maps the geographic distribution of central government investment in China, 
divided into seven groups. Two general patterns can be observed. The first is the spatial 
interdependence suggested by similar central government investment in neighboring 
provinces. Such spatial interdependence is partly because many central government 
infrastructure projects are large-scale, such as the West-to-East Electricity Transmission  
project, the West-to-East Gas Transmission  project, and the South-to-North Water 
Diversion  project. For each project, multiple bordering provinces are involved and all 
receive some investment from the central government.6 -Shanghai 
High- on April 2008 involved a total of seven provinces and 
centrally administered municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, 
and Jiangsu). Likewise, -Wuhan Passenger- which 
started on January 2008 involved Hebei, Hubei and Henan provinces (NBS, 2009). 
The second pattern is that per capita tends to be higher 
in the least developed regions (such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia) and the most 
developed regions (such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang). It is interesting to 
observe that the economically less developed provinces, such as Anhui, Henan, and Hunan, 
had a relatively low level of per capita investment from the central government. 
 
                                                             
5 The remaining industries include Information and IT Services, Real Estate, Education, Construction, Finance, 
Renting, Social Security, Wholesale and Retail Sale, and Agriculture. 
6 Details on these interprovincial projects can be found at http://www.chinaculture.org/library/2008-02/07/ 
content_127051.htm, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/21/eng20020821_101851.shtml, and http:// 
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7363582.html. 
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Figure 4. Geographic distribution of central government investment per capita (2008) 
3. The Theoretical Model 
This section presents a theoretical model of the regional allocation of government 
investments, developed based on two areas of the literature. The first relates to Aschauer 
(1989), and introduces regional public infrastructure capital stock into the production 
function. The second relates to Berhman and Craig (1987) and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005), 
where the optimal level of public investment is derived based on a CES social welfare 
function. Based on the theoretical model, four empirical hypotheses will be proposed. 
3.1 Regional production function with spillovers 
As stated in the introduction, the existing literature does not distinguish clearly the regional 
investment made by the central government from that made by the region itself. Instead, it 
considers these two types of investment to be equivalent in increasing local infrastructure 
stock. As a matter of fact, nvestment can not only increase the 
infrastructure stock of a region, but also produce spillover effects (or externalities), which 
take several forms, such as improving information flow to increase the technology level of 
the region, reducing transportation costs or production costs to attract more investment and 
labor, or raising the effect of the transportation network on the regional economy due to the 
network effect of the road. In order to better capture various forms of spillover effects, in the 
following analysis the function E is used to indicate the spillover effects to a jurisdiction 
which are in its neighboring jurisdictions. 
Following Aschauer (1989), the regional production function is specified as: 
 
Yit = Dit + Eit = AitF(Kit, Lit, Rit + Cit ) + E(Cit, Rit, C-it, R-it, Y-it),       (1) 
 
where Y is the regional aggregate output which consists of two functions, the traditional 
production function D and the externality function E. D is a function of Hicks-neutral 
technical change A, private capital K, labor L, and the summation of infrastructure stocks (Rit 
+ Cit) accumulated due to the investments made by the regional government and the central 
government, respectively. E is assumed to be a function of infrastructure stocks of multiple 
regions (Ci, Ri, C-i, and R-i) that are related to each other due to the 
investment. The subscript -i indicates regions that are related neighbors to region i. 
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According to network economics, the network effect increases at an exponential speed as the 
number of nodes increases. In other words, if defining EJ as the partial derivative of E with 
respect to J (J = Ci, Ri, C-i, R-i), and defining EJ2 as the second-order partial derivative, we 
have EJ > 0. The first partial derivative implies that the spillover effects are greater if two 
regions infrastructure capital stocks are higher. In addition, we have EC2 < 0, which 
implies that if these two regions are connected repeatedly, the marginal spillover effects are 
smaller due to an additional node connected. Furthermore, output Y-i also affects the 
magnitude of the spillover effects positively, i.e., EY-i > 0.7 
Defining YJ as the partial derivative of Y with respect to J, and KL as the labor elasticity 
of capital, and taking the first partial derivative of regional output with respect to C, we have:
  
 
.               (2) 
 
Using lower-case variables to indicate per capita of upper-case variables, that is, d= D/N, e = 
E/N, and c = C/N, where N is the population size, Eq. (2) can be written as: 
 
.               (3) 
 
 In the following analysis, we take Aschauer (1989) assumptions on the production 
function D. Specifically, we assume perfectly competitive product and factor markets, D 
exhibits constant returns to scale over the private inputs, and we also assume that the 
elasticity of the factor inputs is equal to the share of factor input in total product according to 
the cost-minimization theory (i.e., ). 
3.2 Social choice rule 
Following the approach of Behrman and Craig (1987) and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005), we 
is to maximize the social welfare of all the 
regions in the country, which has the following CES functional form, 
 
              (4) 
 
where Nit is the population size of region i at time t. The parameter  measures the magnitude 
of aversion to regional output inequality and has a value ranging from negative infinity to one. 
When = 1, the central government is concerned only with efficiency. In such a circumstance, 
total social welfare is equal to the national output (i.e., U = Y); when < 1 and approaches 
negative infinity, inequality aversion rises. The inequality aversion 
rises to the maximum when approaches negative infinity, in which circumstance the central 
government is concerned only with equality. The parameter  is related to equal vs. unequal 
concern and measures the extent to which a focus is placed by the central government on a 
region. It can be an indicator to reflect political considerations. For instance, Boyle and 
Matheson (2009) find that the federal government tends to pay more attention to the key 
states than other states during the presidential election period. In the empirical 
implementation section, we will use the number of committee members (or candidates) that 
each province has in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as a proxy 
                                                             
7 Following the analysis, one possible functional form can be  where ,  
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variable for the political motivation in the regional allocation of public investment made by 
the Chinese central government.  
3.3 Optimal investment of the central government 
-making process is 
to maximize the CES social welfare function (Eq.(4)), which satisfies the production function 
(Eq.(3)) and is subject to the following budgetary constraint: 
 
                   (5) 
 
where Iit infrastructure investment in region i at time t, and 
REVt represents the total revenue obtainable by the central government during time t.8 
Taking the first partial derivative of the welfare function Ut with respect to It yields the 
following first-order condition: 
    (6) 
where t indicates the marginal cost of public revenue which is assumed to vary with time. 
The term  which indicates that infrastructure stock increases by one unit 
followed by one unit increase of government investment. Substituting Yc (Eq.(3)) into Eq. (6) 
we have the following infrastructure investment per 
capita: 
 
      (7) 
 
where The term, measures the spillovers (per capita) of region i to 
region j. Differentiating cit with respect to aggregate output (i.e., yit) yields: 
 
.  (8) 
 
Considering the first part (V1) in the above bracket, assuming that the central government 
has both efficiency and equity concerns (i.e.,  < 1), we have V1 < 0. In addition, |V1| 
decreases as yit rises. Turning to the second part (V2) in the bracket, based on the assumption 
of spillover effects we made earlier in this section, we have . In 
other words, the spillover from region i 
this region) to other involved regions j is larger as the economy of region i grows. Thus, we 
have V2 > 0. In addition, when the number of connections to region i increases, B increases. 
In sum, we expect that as the economy of a specific region grows, the regional optimal 
allocation of central government investment decreases (increases) when V1 + V2 < 0 (V1 + V2 > 
0). Based on the above analysis, we propose and test empirically the following four 
hypotheses. 
                                                             
8 In China, R includes not only budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue, but also obtainable loans. 
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Hypothesis 1 (Spatial effect): One important issue that has been less addressed in the 
literature is the spatial characteristic of public investment. The economy of a region is not 
independent of others, as certain infrastructure investment such as roads, railways, or 
pipelines, due to their particular characteristics, may cover more than one region. Hence, the 
spatial interdependence, to a certain degree, will affect 
allocation behavior. If one jurisdiction obtains an investment from the central government, 
some other jurisdictions are expected to obtain a certain amount of investment funds from the 
central government as well. 
Hypothesis 2 (Temporal effect): Public investment is highly likely to exhibit a temporal 
effect. Certain investment projects, especially some large investment projects that are funded 
by the central government, usually take several years to complete. If one region obtains the 
investment from the central government in one particular year, it is expected to obtain 
continued finance in subsequent years. 
Hypothesis 3 (Economic effect): The economic status quo of a region is one of the most 
important factors that affect central government investment. If the central government has 
both equity and efficiency concerns, the investment from the central government is expected 
to have a U-shaped relationship with the regional economy. In other words, public investment 
is expected to be relatively high in both the economically least and most developed regions, 
but relatively low in the less developed regions. 
Hypothesis 4 (Political effect): In addition to the aforementioned factors, some political 
attitudes may also affect c n a specific region. As 
demonstrated in previous studies, a region is expected to obtain more central governmental 
investment if it has more political clout. 
4. Empirical Model, Data, and Estimation Strategies 
4.1 Model and Data 
 
To test the above hypotheses, we specify a dynamic spatial lag panel data model as follows: 
 
, 
 
i N; t = 1, , T             (9) 
where CENTRALit is the investment made by the central government in province i at time t. 
W is the non-stochastic contiguity-based binary matrix in which each element mij is set to one 
if provinces i and j ( ) share a common border, and zero otherwise. In addition, the matrix 
W is commonly row-standardized such that the elements of each row sum to one. To check 
the robustness of the regression results, we also used an additional spatial weight matrix, the 
distance-based matrix in which each element is defined as being the inverse function of the 
distance between two provinces i and j (i j). 2 is called the spatial lag parameter which 
characterizes contemporaneous spatial correlation between one jurisdiction and other 
geographically proximate jurisdictions. When 2 = 0, Eq. (9) reduces to the traditional 
dynamic panel setting. CENTRALi,t-1 is the lagged investment made by the central 
government to province i at time t-1. This lagged variable is used to reflect the persistent 
. To consider one additional robustness 
check for the persistence effect, next we will use central governmental investment to province 
i lagged two periods. GDPit is the gross domestic product for province i at time t. Both 
variables CENTRAL and GDP are converted into real values using the CPI as the inflation 
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factor and using year 2008 as the base year. The squared GDP variable is used to capture a 
possible nonlinear relationship between levels of the regional economic development and the 
 variables are used 
ROADit and RAILit 
measure respectively the area of paved roads and the length of railway mileages in province i 
at time t, which are two control variables used to proxy for current infrastructure stock. For 
the last robustness check, we will use the initial stock of roads and railways in year 2000 
(ROAD2000, RAILWAY2000) to control for possible endogeneity of such infrastructure 
variables. COMMITTEEit is defined as the number of committee members or candidates that 
province i has during time t in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
weighted by total provincial population size.9 This variable is used to proxy for the political 
i is the fixed provincial effect, t is the 
fixed temporal effect, it is the idiosyncratic disturbance term. In this study, we added the 
number of employees in the state-owned enterprises under the direct administration of the 
State Council. We hypothesized that this variable could measure institutional, economic, and 
even political effects on central gov Due to its statistical 
insignificance, we did not report the result on this variable. 
Some may argue that the central government could indirectly invest in local infrastructure 
through fiscal transfers. Hence, de 
both direct and indirect investment. For several reasons, this paper excludes the indirect 
investment, if any, from our analysis. First, the fiscal transfer from the central government is 
to help local governments to reduce their fiscal deficits, with amounts determined by a 
formula that is independent of the central government direct investment.10 Second, if local 
governments invest part of the fiscal transfer in local infrastructure, their decision-making is 
not top-down. Whether local investments depend on the central investment is a topic for 
future research; it Third, local investment and per capita GDP are 
correlated. Given that our empirical model includes the real per capita GDP, it is appropriate 
not to include local investment. Last, we are unable to obtain the portion of local 
infrastructure investment that is from the central government fiscal transfers. Chinese local 
governments do not provide detailed sources of local infrastructure investment. 
The data for CENTRAL, GDP, ROAD, and RAIL are from China Statistical Yearbook 
which is compiled by China Statistical Press. The data for COMMITTEE is collected from 
INFOBANK. Table 1 lists the variables used in the empirical model and their summary 
statistics. Because more than 90% of the total central investment is allocated to infrastructure, 
investment. The remainder of less than 10% is invested to upgrade local industries, to 
promote industrial productivity. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables of 30 provinces, 2000-2008 (Tibet excluded) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CENTRAL 270 912.502 875.478 101.614 5619.900 
GDP 270 1.714 1.258 0.343 7.452 
ROAD 270 10.055 3.074 3.900 20.280 
                                                             
9 During the period 2001-2008, the 15th (1997-2001), 16th (2002-2007), and 17th (2008- ) Central Committees 
of the Communist Party of China have been in office successively. If a committee member by the date had a 
position in the central government instead of provincial government, we classify her to the province where 
she was born. More detailed information on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China can be 
found at http://www.infobankeip.com/irisweb/CCCPC.htm. 
10 Such a formula is available upon request. 
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RAIL 270 3.902 43.092 0.028 708.559 
COMMITTEE 270 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.071 
CENTRAL: per capita real infrastructure investment spending by the central government to lower-tier 
jurisdictions (provinces, center-administrated municipalities), (RMB/person, 2008 = 100) 
GDP: per capita real gross domestic product (10, 000 RMB/person, 2008 = 100) 
ROAD: area of paved roads per capita (square meters/person) 
RAIL: length of railway mileages per 10,000 persons (kilometer/10,000 persons) 
COMMITTEE: ratio of the number of committee members in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China weighted to total provincial population size ( ) 
 
4.2 Estimation Issue 
 
4.2. 1 Dynamic panel model without spatial effects 
 
The widely used estimation method for a dynamic panel model without spatial effects is 
Arellano and DIFF-GMM) approach and the System 
GMM  (SYS-GMM) approach developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The former approach is based on first-differencing the model so as to remove 
the province-specific effects ( i) and instrument all potentially endogenous variables 
(CENTRALi,t-1, W·CENTRALit, GDPit, GDPit2, ROADit, RAILit, COMMITTEEit) with their 
own proper lagged levels (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Hansen, 1982). While this approach 
can correct for the dynamic panel bias caused in the OLS implementation (Nickell, 1981), the 
DIFF-GMM method suffers from the weak instrument problem in small samples if the 
endogenous variables are close to a random walk, as past level variables (i.e., the instruments) 
are less informative on explaining the differenced variables (i.e., the instrumented variables), 
or the variance of the province-specific effect i is large compared to the variance of the 
time-varying disturbance it (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
To overcome the drawbacks of the DIFF-GMM approach, a closely related but improved 
GMM dynamic panel approach, named SYS-GMM, was proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and later developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).11 The SYS-GMM approach 
estimates a system of two equations simultaneously, namely, the original levels equation with 
suitably lagged first-differences as instruments, and the first-differenced equation with 
suitably lagged levels as instruments. For the SYS-GMM estimator to be consistent, the 
following moment conditions should hold:12 
 
              (10) 
                   (11) 
            (12) 
                 (13) 
)               (14) 
 
As Roodman (2006) suggested, we have to ponder these moment conditions or required 
assumptions before using the SYS-GMM. In empirical implementation it is necessary to 
verify the consistency of the SYS-GMM estimator by applying several specification tests. 
First, the instrument validity will be examined. That is, we need to ascertain that instruments 
are not correlated with the residuals using the Sargan or Hansen test (Blundell and Bond, 
                                                             
11 It should be noticed, though, that both dynamic panel GMM estimations are more robust to measurement 
error (say, province-year specific measurement error) than cross-section regressions. However, both 
estimators may suffer from the same problem of finite sample bias. 
12 We assume that the covariates are weakly exogenous for < t. 
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1998). Recognizing that too many instruments may invalidate the Hansen J test (for joint 
validity of those instruments) and the difference-in-Sargan or difference-in-Hansen tests (for 
subsets of instruments) 9) rule of thumb to keep the number of 
instruments less than the number of individual units in the panel.13 Second, the assumption 
of no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals ( it it-k ) = 0 
for k > = 2) is crucial to guarantee the consistency of the GMM estimator. For this reason, the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test, or the m2 test, is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation (AR(2)), under which the test statistic follows an 
asymptotically standard normal distribution. 14  Rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation implies that the moment conditions listed above are not 
correctly specified. Third, there is no formal test for a weak instrument in the dynamic panel 
setting. Fortunately, we have two informal ways to check whether the instruments are too 
weak to be reliable predictors of the endogenous variables. Firstly, Bun and Windmeijer 
(2010) stated that the SYS-GMM and DIFF-GMM estimators may both suffer from 
small-sample bias, but the bias for the SYS-GMM estimator is rather small when the variance 
2) is equal to the variance of the idiosyncratic disturbance 
2). Hence comparing these two terms from the regression results could provide a hint 
as to whether there is a serious sample bias problem. As a matter of fact, the roughly 
equivalent value for these two variances found in our regression results implies that the 
SYS-GMM estimation results from this study are reliable, which implies the instruments used 
in this study are not (too) weak. Secondly, as suggested by Bond et al. (2001), the GMM 
estimator of 1 can be compared to the OLS estimator which is biased upwards (Hsiao, 1986) 
and to the fixed effects estimator which is biased downwards (Nickell, 1981). A consistent 
GMM estimate is expected to lie in between the OLS and the fixed effects estimates. 
Otherwise, a finite sample bias is susceptible, which may be due to weak instruments. 
For the SYS-GMM approach, we use the two-step estimator to increase efficiency. In 
addition, we use the finite-sample correction method developed by Windmeijer (2005) to 
correct for standard errors in the two-step estimation, without which those standard errors 
tend to be severely downward biased in small samples (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In 
empirical implementation, we include the time dummy variables in the spatial dynamic panel 
model, so that the assumption of no correlation across provinces in the idiosyncratic 
disturbances is more likely to hold. This assumption is required for the autocorrelation test 
and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard errors (Roodman, 2006). 
 
4.2.2 Dynamic panel model with spatial effects 
 
Following Arrelano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998), several studies (for 
instance, Elhorst (2010)) extend the DIFF-GMM estimator to account for spatial effects. 
However, as Elhorst (2010) found, the estimator can be severely biased, especially with 
respect to the spatial autoregressive parameter ( 2). On the contrary, Kukenova and Monteiro 
(2009) and Jacobs et al. (2009) extend the SYS-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) 
to account for spatial effects, known as having the advantage over traditional spatial MLE in 
that the SYS-GMM estimators can also be used to instrument endogenous explanatory 
variables (other than Yt-1 and WYt). More importantly, both studies find that the SYS-GMM 
estimator substantially reduces the bias for the spatially lagged parameter and performs better 
than the DIFF-GMM estimator. For this reason, we will use the latter approach in this 
empirical study. 
                                                             
13 The maximum number of lags used in this study is two. 
14 By construction, the test for AR(1) process in first difference usually rejects the null hypothesis, which is as 
it is mathematically related to i,t-1 via the shared i,t-1 term. 
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Before implementing the spatial dynamic Blundell-Bond-type SYS-GMM regression, it is 
necessary to test for spatial interaction effects. In a cross-sectional setting, Anselin et al. 
(1996) developed two Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for spatially lagged dependent variable 
and for spatial error correlation, and two robust counterparts of these two LM tests. For panel 
data setup, the first two LM tests are: LM-LAG = [e (IT W)Y/ 2]2/J, and LM-ERROR = 
[e (IT W)e/ 2]2/(T×TW), where the symbol  denotes the Kronecker product, I denotes 
the identity matrix, T is the order of the matrix, and e denotes the estimated residual from the 
non-spatial dynamic panel model. J and TW are defined as follows: J = [((IT W)X ) (INT  
X(X X)-1X )(IT W) X  + TTW 2]/ 2, and TW = trace(WW + W W). The two robust LM tests 
are defined as follows: Robust LM-LAG = [e (IT W)Y/ 2 - e (IT W)e/ 2]2/(J - TTW), and 
Robust LM-ERROR = [e (IT W)e/ 2 - TTW/J × e (IT W)Y/ 2]2/[TTW(1 - TTW/J)]. Detailed 
derivation of these tests for a spatial panel data model with spatial fixed effects can be found 
in Debarsy and Ertur (2010). Under the null hypothesis, these tests follow a chi-squared 
distribution with one degree of freedom. 
The spatial dynamic panel model has gained more and more popularity among scholars in 
the last decade in that it takes into joint consideration the time series econometrics (dealing 
with serial dependence between the observations on each spatial unit over time), spatial 
econometrics (dealing with spatial dependence between the observations at each point in 
time), and panel data econometrics (dealing with unobservable spatial and/or time-fixed 
effects). As Elhorst (2012) put in his review of existing literature on the specification and 
estimation of dynamic spatial panel data models, methods developed either for dynamic but 
non-spatial or for spatial but non-dynamic panel data models all produced biased estimates. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
5.1 Main Results 
 
We apply the LM tests for spatially lagged dependent variable and for spatial error correlation, 
and two robust counterparts of these two LM tests based on the residuals obtained from the 
panel regression. The LM diagnostic test statistics are shown at the bottom of Table 2.15 It is 
shown that the LM-LAG robust panel test statistic (29.74) is found to be greater than its 
corresponding critical values (as p = 0.000), while the LM-ERROR robust panel test statistic 
(0.49) is less than its corresponding critical values (p = 0.487). This result implies that a 
spatial interaction effect does exist, and importantly, the spatially lagged panel model 
specification in Eq. (9) is properly specified. Table 2 reports the spatial panel regression 
results (Column 3), but for comparison purposes, we still report the results for two 
non-spatial models  the pooled OLS and the fixed effects models (Column 1 and Column 2). 
Due to missing data on some variables before 2001, we only use panel data from 2001 to 
2008. 
Focusing on the SYS-GMM diagnostic test results, the Hansen tests for the validity of 
overall instruments fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. In addition, 
the AR(2) test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals,16 implying that the SYS-GMM model applied in this study does 
                                                             
15 STATA modules to implement those diagnostic tests and spatial regressions are made by Emad Shehata 
(http://emadstat.110mb.com/stata.htm). 
16 According to Roodman (2009), the number of instruments should not exceed the number of individual units 
(provinces in this study). In this study, the number of instruments is slightly larger than that of the individual 
units. 
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not suffer from misspecification problems as evidenced by the over-identification tests and 
the autocorrelation tests. 
Turning to the coefficient estimates, the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent 
variable ( 1) for the SYS-GMM models lies between the fixed effects estimate (which is 
known to be downward biased) and the pooled OLS estimate (which is upward biased), 
implying that the system-GMM estimates are not subjected to significant finite sample bias. It 
can be seen that the lagged investment variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. Specifically, ceteris paribus, if the central government increased one RMB of public 
investment to a specific region in the last year, it tends to increase 0.71 RMB of public 
investment to that region this year. The empirical finding validates the hypothesis of the 
persistence effect of public investment (Hypothesis 2) proposed above. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of central governmental investments (2001-2008) 
Pooled OLS  
Model 
Fixed Effects  
Model 
System GMM  
Model 
L1.CENTRAL 1.103*** 0.965*** 0.709*** 
(31.53) (18.56) (5.08) 
W.CENTRAL 0.251*** 0.792*** 0.378*** 
(3.05) (2.96) (3.09) 
GDP -234.752** -117.384 -639.143** 
(2.29) (0.86) (2.47) 
GDP2 39.031** 64.221** 117.853*** 
(2.48) (2.01) (3.57) 
COMMITTEE 423.791* 935.444*** 671.385** 
(1.88) (3.05) (2.13) 
ROAD -1.603 5.185 4.598 
(0.79) (0.82) (1.54) 
RAIL 74.560** -134.770 212.260 
(2.49) (1.02) (1.60) 
Constant -116.308 -299.113** -84.948 
(1.55) (2.46) (1.39) 
Year Dummy N Y Y 
Province Dummy N Y N 
R-squared 0.949 0.872 
Observations 240 240 240 
No. of Provinces 30 30 30 
No. of Lagged Instruments 1, 2 
No. of Instruments   34 
Spatial Panel Autocorrelation Tests 
LM Error Panel Test  [0.003] 
LM Error Robust Panel test  [0.487] 
LM Lag Panel Test  [0.000] 
LM Lag Robust Panel test  [0.000] 
System GMM Postestimation Tests 
AR(1) test [0.026] 
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AR(2) test [0.379] 
Hansen over-identification test [0.584] 
Notes: 1) Absolute robust t (Z) statistics are reported in parentheses for pooled OLS, fixed effects (system-GMM) 
model; 2) p values are reported in square brackets; 3) *, **, ***, respectively, indicates significance at the 90%, 
95%, and 99% level. 
 
The spatial lagged parameter is found to be around 0.38 and statistically significant, 
implying that 
provinces. Particularly, one region is able to obtain an additional 0.38 RMB in investment if 
neighboring regions on average get an additional one RMB from the central government. 
This result verifies our first hypothesis. 
With respect to the economic variables, both GDP and its squared term are statistically 
significant. The squared term is found to be positive, revealing a nonlinear relationship 
between the regional economy and the regional investment obtained from the central 
government. To be specific, a U-shaped relationship is found between them. Per capita 
investment by the central government is higher for the economically least developed regions. 
This is expected as, on the one hand, the central government, possibly due to equity 
consideration, has the motivation to promote growth in the least developed regions via 
providing certain kinds of public goods and services. On the other hand, the poor regions may 
demand more assistance from the government. All in all, we expect that these regions will 
obtain more investments from the central government. For the economically most developed 
regions, the U-shaped relationship also suggests that they tend to obtain more investment 
from the central government. This result is not surprising. Probably due to efficiency 
considerations, the central government would invest more in these regions for a higher rate of 
return. As a consequence, less developed regions tend to obtain relatively less investment 
from the central government. In this empirical study, the GDP per capita of 25.9 thousand 
RMB is found to be the turning point (around the 67th percentile of per capita GDP across 31 
regions in 2008).17 These findings support the third hypothesis that the central government 
tends to balance equity and efficiency in making regional infrastructure investment. 
The infrastructure variables (ROAD and RAILWAY) are found to be statistically 
insignificant. That public infrastructure stocks have no effect on the regional investment from 
the central government seems surprising. It could be partially due to the fact that we used 
insufficient and hence poor proxy variables for public infrastructure stocks, as public 
infrastructure includes stocks of not only roads and railways, but also other assets such as 
ports, bridges, and water and sewer systems. Also it could be due to the interaction effects of 
two mixed forces - one force from the possibility that more roads would call for less 
investment, the other from the possibility that more roads demand more maintenance. 
Turning to the political variable, COMMITTEE is found to be statistically significant. 
This result implies that the political effect, indeed, is a significant determinant of the 
investment from the central government. This finding is supportive of the fourth hypothesis. 
The positive and significant result on COMMITTEE suggests that a region will obtain more 
central government investment if it has more political clout. 
 
5.2 Robustness Check 
 
To further assess the robustness of our results, we conduct three additional sensitivity 
analyses. First, we used an alternative spatial weight matrix, i.e., the non-stochastic 
distance-based matrix. Second, instead of using the current road stock variable for province i 
                                                             
17 Among the 31 provinces in 2008, Jilin province had the per capita GDP that was closest to the turning point. 
10 other provinces had a per capita GDP that was beyond the turning point. 
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at time t, we use the beginning level of road stock at year 2000 (ROAD2000 and RAIL2000). 
In other words, we used a time-invariant variable as an independent variable in the panel 
regression. Third, given the persistence of large-scale investment projects, we use the 
investment lagged more than one year as the endogenous variable. Columns 3-4 in Appendix 
Table 3 report, respectively, the results of these three robustness checks, while Column 2 
simply replicates the system GMM results from Table 2 for comparison purposes. In general, 
we found that the coefficient estimators are consistent among each model and there are no 
qualitative changes in our empirical results. But some variations do exist among these models. 
To be specific, 1) there exists a relatively smaller persistence effect in the model using initial 
infrastructure stock variables (model IV) or using investment lagged two years as an 
explanatory variable (model III) than that seen in the base model (model I); 2) Model II, 
which uses the distance-based weights matrix, appears to have a weaker spatial interaction 
effect than does model I, which uses the contiguity-based spatial weights matrix. This result 
could be in line with the fact that bordering regions are spatially more dependent in terms of 
regional infrastructure investment by the central government; 3) the inverted U-relationship 
appears in all model specifications; 4) the infrastructure stock variable measured by length of 
railway mileages shows some weak effects on central governmental investment using models 
III and IV. 
6. Conclusions 
Regional infrastructure investment by the central government plays an important role in 
promoting regional development and reducing regional disparities. Because infrastructure 
projects are often large-scale and involve multiple regions, spatial interdependency exists. 
However, previous studies have virtually ignored such interdependency by focusing only on 
economic and political factors. Furthermore, due to transportation externalities and regional 
protectionism, local governments may not cooperate together in building local infrastructure. 
Through investment, the central government could help to internalize externalities and 
promote better coordinated infrastructure network. 
This paper has examined 
Specifically, the paper presented a theoretical model that helps to formulate four empirical 
hypotheses regarding central  a panel 
of 31 Chinese provinces over the 2001-2008 period, we are able to derive several conclusions. 
First, there is substantial spatial dependence of central government investment across regions. 
If one jurisdiction receives more central governmental investment, its neighboring 
jurisdictions will also receive more. Second, the central government investment exhibits a 
highly persistent effect, as evidenced by the significant temporal effect of investment. Third, 
regional investment from the central investment attempts to balance equity and efficiency in 
its allocation. The least and most developed regions tend to obtain more infrastructure 
investment capital than less developed regions. A U-shaped relationship is observed between 
ce
receiving region. Last, like the cases in western countries, regional political factors do affect a 
 
Our empirical findings suggest that 
investment as an important instrument to promote regional development and reduce regional 
disparities. However, the overall effect on equity depends on relative growth in the most and 
ped 
regions faster, China will see less regional disparity. Otherwise, the efficiency effect could 
outweigh the equity effect and China will suffer from worsening disparity. A better policy 
could be a match system in funding infrastructure projects, especially in the most developed 
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regions. Under this system, the central government might save more resources for the least 
and less developed regions, while still helping the most developed regions to build local 
infrastructure. Given our empirical evidence on the spatial dependency of central government 
investment, coordination among local governments could generate more benefits than 
competition between regions. Therefore, any local infrastructure should be integrated into a 
larger scale network that helps to internalize transportation externalities and prevent from 
local protectionism. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1. Allocations of the 4 trillion RMB central government investment (billion 
RMB) 
Project Amount 
Low-income housing project 400 
Rural water and energy supply projects 370 
Railways, highways, airports, water conservancy, urban power network and other 
major infrastructure constructions 
1500 
Sanitation 150 
Energy-saving projects 210 
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Innovation and industrial restructuring 370 
Infrastructure reconstruction after '5.12' earthquake 1000 
Source: http://www.chinanews.com/cj/cj-gncj/news/2009/05-21/1702615.shtml. 
 
Appendix Table 2. Robustness checks (two-step system GMM results) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Base 
Model 
Weight 
Matrix 
(Distance) 
Initial 
Infrastructure 
Investment 
Lagged Two 
Periods 
L1.CENTRAL 0.709*** 0.889*** 0.645*** 
(5.08) (4.92) (3.61) 
L2.CENTRAL 0.633** 
(2.31) 
W.CENTRAL 0.378*** 0.280** 0.296** 
(3.09) (1.97) (2.18) 
W2.CENTRAL 0.224*** 
(2.83) 
GDP -639.143** -209.242** -181.231** -526.264** 
(2.47) (1.99) (2.48) (2.01) 
GDP2 117.853*** 45.316*** 63.119** 125.910*** 
(3.57) (2.69) (2.20) (3.42) 
COMMITTEE 671.385** 789.002** 427.090** 808.190** 
(2.13) (2.36) (1.98) (2.39) 
ROAD 4.598 24.677 5.159 
(1.54) (0.85) (1.28) 
RAIL 212.260 164.331 159.142* 
(1.60) (1.32) (1.76) 
ROAD2000  2.054 
 (1.05) 
RAIL2000 197.636* 
(1.83) 
Constant -84.948 -271.170 -15.060 -208.825 
(1.39) (0.96) (0.04) (0.53) 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y 
Observations 240 240 240 210 
No. of Provinces 30 30 30 30 
No. of Lagged Instruments 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 
No. of Instruments 34 34 34 34 
System GMM Postestimation Tests 
  AR(1) [0.026] [0.027] [0.023] [0.904] 
  AR(2) [0.379] [0.451] [0.240] [0.697] 
  Hansen over-identification test [0.584] [0.376] [0.685] [0.471] 
Notes: 1) Robust Z statistics are reported in parentheses and p values are reported in square brackets; 2) *, **, 
***, respectively, indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level. 
